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ABSTRACT 
The ever-growing big data and emerging artificial intelligence (AI) demand the use of 
machine learning (ML) and deep learning (DL) methods.  Cybersecurity also benefits from 
ML and DL methods for various types of applications.  These methods however are 
susceptible to security attacks.  The adversaries can exploit the training and testing data of the 
learning models or can explore the workings of those models for launching advanced future 
attacks.  The topic of adversarial security attacks and perturbations within the ML and DL 
domains is a recent exploration and a great interest is expressed by the security researchers 
and practitioners.  The literature covers different adversarial security attacks and perturbations 
on ML and DL methods and those have their own presentation styles and merits.  A need to 
review and consolidate knowledge that is comprehending of this increasingly focused and 
growing topic of research; however, is the current demand of the research communities.  In 
this review paper, we specifically aim to target new researchers in the cybersecurity domain who 
may seek to acquire some basic knowledge on the machine learning and deep learning models 
and algorithms, as well as some of the relevant adversarial security attacks and perturbations. 
   
Keywords:  Machine learning algorithm; adversarial security attack; adversarial perturbation; 
adversarial example; vulnerabilities; exploitations. 
 
Highlights: 
 
• Machine learning methods are vulnerable to adversarial security attacks 
• Adversarial examples, poisoning, and exploratory attacks are most common 
• SVM, NN, and DNN are popular ML/DL methods to study adversarial security 
• MNIST, CIFAR, and ImageNet are popular choices of datasets 
• Research in Adversarial Security Attacks and Perturbations is fast growing 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The domain of artificial intelligence (AI) and its subdomains of machine learning (ML) and 
deep learning (DL) have made a tremendous impact on our lives in recent years.  A wide variety 
of products and applications in nearly every sector exist where the technologies of artificial 
intelligence are the driving force.  Amazon Alexa, Apple SIRI, and Tesla smart car are some of 
the few generic examples of these technologies.  The growth and development of these 
technologies themselves are attributed to the advancement in information technology (IT) sector 
and the big data as a result of expansion of Internet.  Artificial intelligence (AI) which is the 
science of making a machine intelligent without explicitly programmed is one emerging market 
and hot research domain.  The technologies of AI can process big data but also harness a huge 
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computing power of the machine.  Behind all this the models and algorithms of machine learning 
and deep learning working on varieties of data types and sizes make intelligent decisions and 
allow the machine becoming human like a reality. 
The ML and DL have been used in the applications of pattern recognition, image 
recognition, recommendation and filtering, network intrusion detection, malware detection, spam 
detection, data mining, cryptosystems, physically unclonable function (PUF), self-driving cars, 
unmanned autonomous systems, electric grid, and the areas of medicine and healthcare, 
homeland security, cybersecurity, marketing, sales, etc. (Bulò et al., 2017; Che et al., 2018; 
Duddu, 2018; Liu et al., 2018; Mispan et al., 2018; Padilla, Meyer-Baese, & Foo, 2018; P, 
Kumar, & T, 2016; Sahingoz et al., 2018; Sahoo et al., 2015; Sethi & Kantardzic, 2018b; Su, 
Zwolinski, & Halak).  Some of these applications pertain to critical infrastructures that have 
national interests and strategic importance, whereas others have their influence or mark globally 
(Duddu, 2018).  As with any technology, the design and development of ML and DL models or 
algorithms is a continuous process and requires input from the end users for improvements (Liu 
et al., 2018).  The data that those models and algorithms are fed sometimes distributed over the 
computers and networks or of completely unknown character and behavior.  The security, 
therefore, is a concern or become important in meeting the requirements or validating the 
accuracy of the models or results.  Every process of the ML and DL is vulnerable to attack from 
the training to testing phase and to the design of the model or algorithm itself. 
The models of machine learning traditionally assumed the environment was benign, because 
of the limited computing platforms and the simple codes execution of those models on the 
training and test data sets (Goodfellow, McDaniel, and Papernot, 2018); however, in the 
adversarial domain and with the advancement of technologies, that assumption does not hold 
valid and the distributions of both the training and test data sets may significantly differ 
(Cárdenas, 2012; Sethi & Kantardzic, 2018a,b).  Adversaries armed with the abundant of open 
source and commercial tools on the Internet and with an evil intent can do a variety of damages 
to the ML and DL models or their claimed results, without the designers or operators of those 
noticing any wrongdoings for some time (Liu et al., 2018).  For example, the control of the 
autonomous cars; bypassing the spam filters, fake recommendations, exploitation of facial and 
voice recognition systems, etc. are all the possibilities (as cited in Liu et al., 2018).   
Some scholars in the early-to-mid 2000 brought the much-needed attention and contributed 
on the issue of security in ML and DL models and algorithms.  A few noted seminal work in this 
area includes: Dalvi’s (2004) concept of adversarial classification and evasion of linear 
classifiers; Lowd and Meek’s (2005) concept of adversarial learning and adversary-aware 
classifiers; Barreno et al.’s (2006) views on ML problems and taxonomies, etc. (as cited in 
Biggio & Roli, 2018; Liu et al, 2018; Li et al., 2018).  Since then the work on adversarial 
security attacks and perturbations is on-going and is one of the research topics of interest among 
the scholars of cybersecurity and artificial intelligence (Corona, Biggio, & Maiorca, 2016). 
There have been several publications such as Akhtar and Mian (2018), Barreno et al. (2010), 
Bae et al. (2019), Chakraborty et al. (2018), Duddu (2018), Gardiner and Nagaraja (2016), Li et 
al. (2018), Liu et al. (2018), Kumar & Mehta (2018), Yuan et al. (2018), Zhang et al. (2019), etc. 
that cover the literature reviews of adversarial security attacks and perturbations.  They all bring 
useful information on this topic that is unique and meritorious.  Some provide in-depth coverage 
on the theoretical aspects of various adversarial security attacks types, whereas others focus more 
on the perturbations from the perspectives of computer-vision (CV) researchers.  Furthermore, 
some efforts have also been towards the quantification and design of the classifiers in the 
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adversarial domains, based on the feature selection or engineering (Eykholt, K., & Prakash; 
Katzir & Elovici, 2018).  The research in the domains of artificial intelligence and its 
subdomains of ML and DL is increasing at an unprecedent level and most definitely the coverage 
of the security aspects will go together (Carlini et al., 2019; Joseph et al., 2012; Newcombe, 
2018; Rieck, 2016; Thornton et al., 2015).  We anticipate an increased number of research 
publications in these topics and that includes reviews covering different perspectives and 
coverage over the years.  In this review paper, we aim to target new entrants of cyber security in 
the research area who may seek to acquire some basic knowledge on the machine learning and 
deep learning models and algorithms, as well as some of the relevant adversarial security attacks 
and perturbations.  We avoided providing extensive detail on each security attack or perturbation 
type, comprising of mathematical equations and theoretical aspects; however, the readers are 
expected and encouraged to consult the references listed for guidance on this topic.   
The presentation of this paper is as follows.  Section 2 provides a brief overview on the 
background and types of machine learning and deep learning methods, as well as a list of those 
with small descriptions.  Section 3 provides a brief overview containing the classification 
schemes, taxonomies, definitions, and terms of adversarial security attacks and perturbations on 
ML and DL systems, as well as a list of those with small descriptions. Section 4 provides a 
comparison analysis of selective security attacks, ML/DL methods, datasets, and their relevant 
research studies.  Section 5 provides discussion and conclusion based on the findings and some 
directions for future research.  Appendix - in the last section - provides a table with a 
comprehensive list of security attacks and perturbations. 
 
2. Machine learning (ML) and deep-learning (DL) Methods 
 
2.1 Brief Overview 
 
Machine learning (ML) and deep-learning (DL) are a subset of bigger technology group 
called artificial intelligence (AI). The history of artificial intelligence together with the 
machine learning and deep neural network (DNN) (a precursor to deep learning) goes back to 
the 1940s and since then the work is ongoing in the field with some big marks in the 1980s 
(Alom et al., 2018).  Now with the advancement in computer and related technologies, a 
growing and regenerated interest and development can be seen again in recent years.  Deep 
learning (DL) is the latest creation with works such as the Hinton lab’s training for DNNs in 
2006 and AlexNet by Alex Krizhevesky in 2012 (as cited in Alom et al. (2018)).  Artificial 
intelligence (AI) is the science of making a machine intelligent that closely exhibits the 
character of human in terms of thinking and abilities without explicitly programmed.  
Machine learning (also known as shallow learning) and deep learning with their learning 
methods that consists of algorithms and models and the use and input of different data types 
and sizes allow to handle and automate AI-related tasks such as pattern recognition, decision-
making, observations of a dynamic environment without explicit instructions (Ateniese et al., 
2015; Xue & Chua, 2018).  ML and DL algorithms, models, designs and architectures differ 
in some respects.  For example, ML algorithms lack automatic feature engineering and have 
low detection rate, inability of detecting small perturbations in the sample, or handling large 
datasets, however, DL algorithms or models can overcome some of these limitations or 
challenges (Xin et al., 2018).  DL uses the representation learning for a feature selection and 
can handle large and multi-layered datasets (Apruzzese et al., 2018; Diro & Chilamkurti, 
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2018).  The superiority of algorithms and training data sets affect the effectiveness of trained 
machines or the performance of the models and therefore, are sometimes guarded as a trade 
secret (at least the data sets) (Ateniese et al., 2015). 
ML and DL methods, networks, models, or systems - depending on the algorithms, data 
type, and tasks - can be categorized, according to Alom et al. (2018) and Xin et al. (2018), as 
follows:  
• Supervised.  The input data is labeled for training and the learned procedure is used on the 
test data. 
• Semi-supervised.  The combined method of supervised and unsupervised that reduces the 
label efforts or uses the partial labeled data, providing high accuracy of the algorithms in 
large data. 
• Unsupervised.  The input data is unlabeled, and the key features of data are described or 
summarized. 
• Reinforcement learning.  The method that requires exploration and applies to unknown 
environments; sometimes also called semi-supervised.   
Also, ML and DL methods are based on a single classifier, hybrid classifier (cascading two 
or more classifiers), and ensemble (a group of weak algorithms or weak learners; use of data 
resampling techniques such as boosting and bagging and the strategy of majority vote) classifier 
(Tsai et al., 2009). 
 
2.2 Machine Learning Methods – Supervised 
 
2.2.1 Naive Bayes (NB) 
 
A probabilistic classifier or model that assumes the input features are independent from each 
other (Apruzzese et al., 2018).  Also, NB estimates the parameters based on the maximum 
likelihood principle.  The classifier is simple and scalable and can produce fast results on a small 
training data (Guerrero-Higueras, DeCastro-García, & Matellán, 2018).  The classifier uses 
conditional probability formula to answer the probability of a certain event (Nguyen, 2018; Tsai 
et al., 2009).  NB is typically represented by a directed acyclic graph (DAG) having nodes and 
links (Tsai et al., 2009). 
 
2.2.2 Logistic Regression (LR) 
 
A categorical classifier that is based on a discriminative model and assumes the input 
features are independent to each other (Apruzzese et al., 2018).  The target classified value in 
this method is expected to be a linear combination of the input variables (Guerrero-Higueras et 
al., 2018).  The model uses a logistic function and coordinate descent (CD) algorithm (the 
default in Scikit-Learn software) to classify input variables (Guerrero-Higueras et al., 2018). 
 
2.2.3 Support Vector Machine (SVM) 
  
A non-probabilistic classifier that was proposed by Vapnik in 1998 (Apruzzese et al., 2018; 
Tsai et al., 2009). It uses hyperplanes and kernels such as linear, polynomial, and Gaussian 
Radial Basis Function in high dimensional space to maximize distance between categories of 
samples and can be used for the tasks of classification, regression, and outlier detection 
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(Chakraborty et al., 2018; Nguyen, 2018).  The classifier performs poorly in multi-class 
classifications and this limited scalability leads to long processing times (Apruzzese et al., 2018); 
however, the classifier is robust for binary classification of training vectors belonging to two 
different classes and outlier detection (Tsai et al., 2009).  The classifier also uses a penalty factor 
allowing the tradeoff between the misclassified samples and the width of a decision boundary 
(Tsai et al., 2009). 
 
2.2.4 Decision Tree (DT) 
 
A non-parametric classifier that uses decisions or tree-chart like structure to classify a 
sample (Tsai et al., 2009; Nguyen, 2018).  The classification starts at the root node and finish 
at the leaf node representing a classification category (Tsai et al., 2009; Gu Guerrero-Higueras 
et al., 2018).  Several well-known implementations of this classifier with different algorithms 
exists such as CART, ID3, and C4.5.  CART can be used as classification or regression tree 
depending on the categorical or numerical variable (Guerrero-Higueras et al., 2018). 
 
2.2.5 Random Forest (RF) 
 
A classier that uses multiple decision trees and provides the unified final response based 
on those trees (Apruzzese et al., 2018).  The classifier uses the technique of the decision tree 
and an additional vector through boostrap re-sampling (Guerrero-Higueras et al., 2018).  The 
classifier is appropriate for multi-class classification and large datasets; however, it is prone 
to error such as overfitting (Apruzzese et al., 2018). 
 
2.2.6 Hidden Markov Model (HMM) 
 
A model that allows the treatment of a system as a set of states that are hidden and 
produces outputs with different probabilities (Apruzzese et al., 2018).  The model allows to 
determine the inputs based on the observable outputs with applications in temporal behavior, 
reinforcement learning, the likelihood of a sequence of events.  The model can be worked 
with both labeled and unlabeled datasets (Apruzzese et al., 2018).  
 
2.2.7 K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) 
 
A non-parametric and one of the most simple and traditional classifiers that computes the 
approximate distances between different points in the input vectors (Guerrero-Higueras et al., 
2018; Tsai et al., 2009).  KNN is an instance-based learning that uses input vector and classify 
new instances without a formal training stage (Tsai et al., 2009).  The classifier is suitable for 
multi-class problems but with some computational costs as it compares all the training sample 
(Apruzzese et al., 2018).  K is an important parameter in the classifier that influences the 
classification time and accuracy of prediction (Tsai et al., 2009).  KNN is the foundational for 
unsupervised learning; however, the classification of discrete labels in supervised learning has 
also been used (Guerrero-Higueras et al., 2018).  The ML software such as Scikit-Learn 
implements K-Neighbors classifier based on the nearest neighbors where users can manipulate 
the K-integer value (5 by default) (Guerrero-Higueras et al., 2018). 
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2.2.8 Neural Network (NN) or Shallow Neural Network (SNN) 
The algorithm or network is based on the neural networks which is inspired by the 
biological neurons or the collection of perceptron (Apruzzese et al., 2018; Chakraborty et al., 
2018).  The network uses weights via back-propagation algorithm and an activation function 
to determine the output (Chakraborty et al., 2018).  The network is organized in layers of 
sensory nodes (input) and hidden layers (output) (Guerrero-Higueras et al., 2018; Tsai et al., 
2009).  The network is used in the environment where the relationship between the input and 
output is not clear or for recognizing patterns (Tsai et al., 2009; Guerrero-Higueras et al., 
2018).  Some examples include ML supervised learning (e.g., Multi-layer Perceptron (MLP) 
and Artificial Neural Network (ANN)), DL supervised learning (e.g., Convoluted Neural 
Network (CNN) and Deep Neural Network (DNN)) and unsupervised learning (Self-
Organizing Maps (SOM)) (Chakraborty et al., 2018; Tsai et al., 2009; Guerrero-Higueras et 
al., 2018). 
 
2.3. Machine Learning Methods – Unsupervised 
 
2.3.1 Clustering 
 
Clustering models or algorithms find data points with similar characteristics or patterns in 
unlabeled multidimensional data and do not require any explicit description of the classes or 
categories (Apruzzese et al., 2018; Nguyen, 2018).  Examples include: Apriori algorithm, K-
means, K-nearest neighbors, probabilistic learning - Expectation Maximization (EM) and 
Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM); dimensionality reduction - Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA) and Singular Value Decomposition (SVD); density-based - Density-based Spatial 
Clustering of Applications with Noise (DBSCAN) and DENsity-based CLUstEring 
(DENCLUE), etc. 
 
2.3.2 Association Rules 
 
The rules identify and predict unknown patterns in data (Apruzzese et al., 
2018).  Sometimes the excessive output of those rules and the validities require human 
inspection (Apruzzese et al., 2018).  Some examples include Apriori, FP-Growth, ECLAT, etc. 
 
2.4 Deep Learning Methods – Supervised 
 
2.4.1 Deep Neural Network (DNN) 
 
All deep learning algorithms belong to the Neural Networks (NN) or Deep Neural 
Networks (DNN) and are based on the biological neurons, like the neural network of ML 
(Apruzzese et al., 2018).  The network consists of many layers that are capable of feature 
extraction or representation (autonomous) learning (Apruzzese et al., 2018).  
 
2.4.2 Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) 
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CNN is a variant of DNN that consists of convolutional or sub-sampling layers and fully 
connected layers sharing the weights and reducing the number of parameters (Apruzzese et al., 
2018; Chakraborty et al., 2018).  CNN uses a feature map that is further reduced in 
dimensionality by pooling or sub-sampling, while retaining important information (Chakraborty 
et al., 2018).  CNN uses feature extraction and can handle tasks related to data and images 
recognition (Chakraborty et al., 2018). 
 
2.4.3 Feed-forward Neural Network (FNN) 
 
FNN is a variant of DNN where neurons are interconnected between layers and information 
is forward directional instead of cyclic as in RNN (Apruzzese et al., 2018).  A network that can 
be used for classification without any assumption on the input data but that comes with a 
computational cost (Apruzzese et al., 2018) 
 
2.3.4 Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) 
 
A variant of DNN that make use of a memory or sequential information.  The inputs and 
outputs are not independent; rather the output is dependent on the previous calculation in the 
sequence.  They are sequence generators with high computational cost and can handle tasks 
related to natural language processing (NLP), text and image processing (Apruzzese et al., 
2018).  Some examples include Long-Short Term Memory (LSTM), Gated Recurrent Units 
(GRU), etc. 
 
2.5 Deep Learning Methods – Semi-supervised 
 
2.5.1 Semi-supervised Learning 
 
Semi-supervised learning (sometimes called Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL)) is 
based on the partially labeled datasets and the learning problem in an unknown environment 
(Alom et al., 2018).  A combination of DL such as DRL and Generative Adversarial Networks 
(GAN), and LSTM and GRU of RNN has been used as a semi-supervised learning (Alom et 
al., 2018).  The learning uses cases can be seen for the decision making in Sciences and 
Economics, the reward strategy in Neurosciences, and the behavior knowledge of robots, etc. 
(Alom, et al., 2018).  The knowledge of some essential functions and concepts such as Q-
Learning, Deep Q-Networks (DQN), Policy Gradient, Transfer Learning are desired for 
working with DRL. 
 
2.6 Deep Learning Methods – Unsupervised 
 
2.6.1 Deep Belief Network (DBN) 
 
The network uses a Restricted Boltzmann Machine (RBM) which is a two-layer neural 
network (Apruzzese et al., 2018; Alom et al., 2018).  RBM is an undirected generative model 
that uses the energy function and the hidden layer to explain the distribution of variables of 
interest (Alom et al., 2018).  DBN is good in feature extraction but require training phase and 
unlabeled datasets (Apruzzese et al., 2018). 
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2.6.2 Auto Encoder (AE) 
  
A class of neural networks that uses the encoder and decoder phases.  The input data is 
mapped to feature representation for task related to dimensionality reduction, compression, 
fusion, etc. (Alom et al., 2018).  There are various auto encoder types such as Stacked 
Autoencoders (SAE), Sparse AE, Split-Brain AE, etc. (Alom et al., 2018).  SAE can work on 
pre-training tasks, small datasets with high accuracy in results (Apruzzese et al., 2018). 
 
2.6.3 Generative Adversarial network (GAN) 
  
GAN - developed by Goodfellow in 2014 - is a zero-sum game between two neural 
networks or between the two players, Discriminator (output) and Generator (input) (Alom et al., 
2018).  The discriminative network is responsible for distinguishing the original dataset and the 
one that is produced by GAN, whereas the generative deep network, taking the sample from the 
discriminative network and some noise added, is responsible for producing adversarial examples 
that are very close to the original set (Chakraborty et al., 2018).  GAN has been used in several 
domains or has applications such as realistic images of objects, game development, motion 
development, etc. (Alom et al., 2018).  GAN has been used as a semi-supervised or unsupervised 
learning and its many improved versions exist such as Deep Convolutional GAN (DCGAN), 
Coupled Generative Adversarial Network (CoGAN), Bidirectional Generative Adversarial 
Networks (BiGANs), etc. (Alom et al., 2018).  Some other examples of GAN include MalGAN, 
APE-GAN, DCGANs by Radford et al., GAN based attack by Hitai et al., adversarial examples 
of images and text using GAN model by Zhao et al., variational autoencoder (VAE) – GAN, 
adversarial autoencoder (AAE), etc. (Duddu, 2018; Li et al, 2018). 
 
2.6.4 Self-Organized Maps (SOM) 
  
A neural-network based and unsupervised learning algorithm that was developed by 
Kohonen in 1982 (Tsai et al., 2009; Chakraborty et al., 2018).  The algorithm uses a process of 
self-organization and reduces the dimensionality of input vectors into usually two dimensions 
representative output vectors (Tsai et al., 2009).  The algorithm also uses the winning node 
which is the neuron closest to the training set and group the output vectors with similar weights 
in a self-organized ordered map after training (Tsai et al., 2009). 
 
2.6.5 Genetic Algorithm (GA) or Genetic Programming (GP) 
 
The algorithm belongs to the group of Evolutionary Computation (EC) which uses the 
biologically inspired natural selection and evolution process (Tsai et al., 2009; Nguyen, 2018).  
The algorithm generates a large population of variables of interest or candidate programs and 
evaluates the performance of those using the fitness of measure function (Elwahsh et al., 2018; 
Tsai et al., 2009).  Any weak performing variables are replaced by high performing variables 
using the genetic recombinant, natural selection, crossover, and mutation in large iterations (Tsai 
et al., 2009; Nguyen, 2018).  Other algorithm or technique such as Particle Swarm Optimization 
and Ant Colony Optimization belong to EC group (Nguyen, 2018). 
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2.6.6 Fuzzy logic 
 
Fuzzy logic is based on the Fuzzy set theory and explains the phenomenon in real-world 
using the values for reasoning that are between 0 and 1 (Tsai et al., 2009).  The degree of logic is 
flexible and not a hard statement of true or false (Tsai et al., 2009).  For example, rain is a natural 
phenomenon and its chances and amount falling varies (Tsai et al., 2009). 
 
3. Adversarial security attacks on machine learning 
 
3.1 Brief overview 
 
A variety of taxonomies, definitions, models, and categories of security attacks on machine 
learning (ML) and deep learning (DL) systems that are based on the adversarial capabilities, 
knowledge, goals, resources, and the target criteria exists (Corona, Giacinto, & Roli, 2013; Li et 
al., 2018; Sethi & Kantardzic, 2018a) and some of which are presented below.  According to 
Barreno (2008), Barreno et al. (2006 and 2010), Biggio and Roli (2018), Chakraborty et al. 
(2018), Li et al. (2018), Liu et al. (2018), Ozdag (2018), Shi, Sagduyu and Grushin (2017), and 
Shi and Sagduyu (2017), the adversarial security attacks of ML and DL systems can be described 
along the following schemes: 
 
• Influence 
• Causative attack.  Targets the training process or the training data is altered.  The model 
trained on the altered data provides the manipulated output. It is sometimes also called 
the poisoning attack. 
• Exploratory attack.  Targets after the training process.  Explores or probe the learner for 
useful information.  Can exploit misclassifications but do not alter the training process. 
• Evasion attack.  Targets after the training process.  Modifies the input data to the learner 
that results in an incorrect prediction or evade detection. 
• Specificity 
• Targeted attacks.  Targets the specific points, instances, or exploits that are continuous 
streams. 
• Indiscriminate.  Targets the general class of points, instances, or exploits in a random 
non-targeted manner. 
• Security violation 
• Integrity attack.  A successful attack on assets via false negatives and that is being 
classified as normal traffic. 
• Availability attack.  A broad class of an attack that makes the system unusable with 
classification errors, denial of service, false negatives and positives, etc. 
• Privacy violation attack.  An exploratory attack type that reveals sensitive and 
confidential information from the data and models.  Also known as model extraction, 
inversion, or hill-climbing attack. 
 
Also, according to Biggio and Roli (2018), Chakraborty et al. (2018), Duddu (2018), Li et al. 
(2018), Yuan (2018), the adversaries might have different capabilities, goals, and a complete or 
partial knowledge of ML and DL systems with the phases of data input, features selection, 
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algorithms and parameters, training the model and output.  They explained the adversarial 
security environment using the following taxonomies and definitions: 
 
• White box attack.  An adversary has a complete knowledge of the ML and DL models or 
systems. 
• Gray box attack.  An adversary has some knowledge of the ML and DL models or systems. 
• Black box attack.  An adversary has no knowledge of the ML and DL systems.  They are 
classified into non-adaptive, adaptive, and strict black box. 
• Targeted and untargeted Attack.  A targeted security attack targets a targeted class of an input 
or output.  An example: intrusion detection binary classification system.  The untargeted (or 
indiscriminate) does not target a targeted class of an input or output.  An example: a single 
image perturbation. 
• Adversarial capabilities.  Data injection, modification, and logic corruption. 
• Adversarial goals.  Confidence reduction, misclassification, target misclassification, source 
and target misclassification. 
• Attack frequency.  One-time attacks; iterative attacks 
• Transferability property.  The lack of knowledge of the target model can be compensated by 
the local trained model of the attacker.  The adversarial examples that mislead model A are 
likely to mislead model B.  Also, the adversarial examples can be transferred or used on 
different models with different algorithms. 
• Training phase modification:  Adversaries can fine-tune parameters and manipulate labels 
and inputs. 
• Testing phase modification: Using a white-box setup, adversarial sample crafting using the 
sensitivity estimation and perturbation selection. 
• Privacy preserving models: Ensures the privacy of user’s data - CryptoNet, Deep Learning 
using garbled circuits (GC), etc. and use randomization algorithms, secure multi-party 
computation, homomorphic encryption (HE), etc. 
 
Finally, there are some additional terms and definitions that aid in understanding the adversarial 
security attack scenarios. 
 
• Adversarial Examples (AE).  An image is vulnerable to noise introduction, natural 
perturbations (such as fast gradient sign, fog, and sunlight, etc.) or pixels manipulation 
(Ozdog, 2018) and that can be exploited by the adversary.  The adversarial examples or 
attacks are also “subtly altered images, objects, or sounds that fool AIs without setting off 
human alarm bells,” explained Hutson (2018; para 4).  Several benchmark datasets are 
available or real-world inputs that can serve as adversarial examples.  A classifier can be 
fooled into misclassifying the (perturbed) sample which possibly can still be classified by a 
human eye (Ozdog, 2018).  There are targeted and untargeted or non-targeted attacks using 
adversarial examples and those are based on perturbations according to some distance 
metrics (Wang, 2018). 
• Perturbations.  Disturbances or changes (or adding some noise) in the appearance of an 
image or motion of an object are called perturbations.  Small perturbations that are close to 
the original samples and unnoticeable by a human eye, is the basis for adversarial examples 
that are used for training datasets or observations of the security attacks in the adversarial 
environment (Yuan et al., 2018).  A small perturbation or minimally perturbed adversarial 
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example (an example case of evasion attack); however, is not always good in the security 
assessment of ML or DL algorithm; rather, it is good for observing the sensitivity of the 
algorithm, reported Biggio and Roli (2018).  For a thorough security assessment, the 
parameters related to maximum confidence of the classifier should be considered, because 
the adversary will try to maximize that on the output (Biggio & Roli, 2018).  Those 
perturbations affect the performance of ML and DL models and they are classified as 
follows: perturbation scope (individual or universal); perturbation limitation (optimized or 
constrained); perturbation measurement (lp, the magnitude of the perturbation by the p-norm 
distance; l0, l2, l∞ lp metrics) or psychometric perceptual adversarial similarity score (PASS)) 
(Yuan et al., 2018).  Also, the methods of one-shot/one-step and iterative are used for 
generating adversarial perturbations that involve using a single and multiple steps 
computation (Akhtar & Mian, 2018).  Finally, the amount of perturbations and its 
effectiveness on the successfulness of attack or the effect on the classifier’s confidence level 
can also be described using the best-effort attack (a minimum amount of perturbation) and 
bounded attack (a fixed-range of perturbations) (Li et al., 2018). 
• Distance Metrics.  The measurements of the similarity between an adversarial example and 
its original copy (Wang, 2018).  There are three widely used distance metrics in the Lp form 
such as L1, L2, and L3 (Li et al., 2018; Wang, 2018). 
• Benchmark datasets.  The availability of small or large datasets, well-known ML and DL 
models in the public domain, and the complex and computationally intensive learning models 
make it hard to attack and defend for both adversaries and defenders (Yuan et al., 
2018).  There are some well-known datasets such as ImageNet, MNIST, CIFAR, GTSRB, 
etc. and models such as AlexNet, GoogLeNet, LeNet, VGG, CaffeNet, ResNet, etc., useful in 
evaluating adversarial security attacks (Yuan et al., 2018). 
• Defenses.  There are different defensive mechanisms and approaches to adversarial security 
attacks (Carlini et al., 2019).  For example, the security assessment mechanisms, 
countermeasures in the training phase, countermeasures in the testing phase, data security 
and privacy, according to Liu et al. (2018).  And the modified input, modified networks, 
network add-ons, etc., according to Akhtar and Mian (2018).  Brute-force adversarial 
training, data compression and randomization, gradient regularization, defense distillation, 
DeepCloak, Reject on Negative Impact (RONI), etc. are some examples of defenses (Liu et 
al., 2018; Akhtar & Mian, 2018). 
 
3.2 . Adversarial security attacks and perturbations 
3.2.1 Poisoning attacks 
 
Poisoning attacks aim to misclassify samples or output test data using the poisoned samples 
or adversarial examples in the training data set (Biggio & Roli, 2008; Duddu, 2018).  The attack 
vector is exclusive to training data set and depending on the attacker capabilities, maximizes ML 
and DL models’ classification or clustering errors, according to Duddu (2018) and Gardiner and 
Nagaraja (2016).  Some examples of poisoning attacks include: boiling frog attack (An iterative 
attack where test data is poisoned incrementally and over time), label-flipping attack (A 
causative integrity/availability attack where an attacker introduces noise or flips labels 
(legitimate to malicious or vice-versa) in the training data set), bridging attack (a causative 
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integrity/availability attack that introduces points between clusters, making them to join or split), 
etc. (Duddu, 2018; Gardiner & Nagaraja, 2016). 
 
3.2.2 Anchor points (AP) attacks 
 
Attackers with a limited probing budget, malicious samples, and goals of evasion and 
immediate benefits to them exploit the anchor points attacks (Sethi & Kantardzic, 2018a).   In 
these attacks, the legitimate samples serve as anchor points or seed samples that further allows to 
advance attacks or explore the model workings (Sethi & Kantardzic, 2018a).  The zero-day 
exploits of the vulnerabilities without their fixes is one example (Sethi & Kantardzic, 2018a). 
 
3.2.3 Reverse engineering attacks (RE) attacks 
 
Reverse engineering attacks avoid detection, extract features related to the classifiers, and 
obstruct retraining processes (Sethi & Kantardzic, 2018a).  The selection of models, attack 
environment, scalability of the data, and availability of probes, etc. influence the reverse 
engineering attacks (Sethi & Kantardzic, 2018a).  These types of attack require both the 
legitimate and malicious sample to be successful, whereas in comparison to anchor points (AP) 
that require only the legitimate seed sample (Sethi & Kantardzic, 2018a). 
 
3.2.4 Dictionary attacks 
 
Dictionary attacks are a form of poisoning attacks and are categorized into indiscriminate or 
targeted type (Gardiner and Nagaraja, 2016).  They belong to the family of causative attacks and 
work against the classifiers train on words or token-based features (Gardiner and Nagaraja, 
2016).  Attackers insert malicious data with an intention that it will be included in future training 
data sets and cause classification (Gardiner and Nagaraja, 2016).  For example, SpamBayes - a 
classifier system - that is fooled by spam email containing legitimate dictionary words, as cited 
in Gardiner and Nagaraja (2016).  
 
3.2.5 Mimicry attacks 
 
Mimicry attacks are the exploratory attacks type and where the attackers use the attack 
points that appear to be a benign point (Gardiner and Nagaraja, 2016).  The attacks focus on 
exploring benign and malicious points in the data features, and not acquiring explicit knowledge 
about the classification algorithm (Gardiner and Nagaraja, 2016).  The attacks become successful 
by reducing the distance between the attack points and benign points in a targeted and 
indiscriminate manner (Gardiner and Nagaraja, 2016). These attacks mostly have demonstrated 
against the classifiers but clustering algorithms with distance functions are also vulnerable 
(Gardiner and Nagaraja, 2016). Wagner and Soto (2002) introduced these attacks, as cited in 
Gardiner and Nagaraja (2016). 
 
3.2.6 Equation-solving or model extraction attacks 
 
Equation-solving attacks target models with equations and their variables (Duddu, 2018; 
Nguyen, 2018). The attackers can plug-in values of the variables and find the values of the 
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unknown variables; thereby, revealing some information about the models and the architectures 
to the attackers (Duddu, 2018).  The popular models such as neural networks, decision trees, 
multilayer perceptron (MLP), variants of logistic regression - binary logistic regression (BLR) 
and multiclass logistic regression (MLR) - and APIs (application programming interface) within 
the cloud-based machine learning (ML) services (such as BigML, Amazon ML, etc.) are the 
most targeted and vulnerable to equation-solving attacks (Duddu, 2018; Chakraborty et al., 2018; 
Nguyen, 2018).  Tramer et al. demonstrated some examples of this black-boxed, model 
extraction attack (Chakraborty et al., 2018; Nguyen, 2018). 
 
3.2.7 Model inversion attacks 
 
Model inversion attacks allow the attackers to gain insight about the training data and 
further aid in cloning the model that is close to the actual model (Nguyen, 2018). These types of 
attacks exploit the confidence values of the output of the model in a variety of settings and 
applications (Chakraborty, 2018). Some demonstrated examples of this attack type can be seen 
with models based on multilayer perceptron (MLP), denoising auto-encoder (DAE) network, 
SoftMax regression and Machine learning (ML) APIs (Chakraborty et al., 2018).  Fredrickson et 
al. demonstrated these attacks using their proposed algorithm using the least biased maximum a 
posteriori (MAP) for the computation of the optimal input features (Duddu, 2018; Nguyen, 
2018). 
 
3.2.8 Model or membership inference attacks 
 
Model inference attacks involve the attacker sending well-crafted queries to the target 
models and obtaining their predictions (Chakraborty et al. 2018; Duddu, 2018). The attackers 
may employ shadow models for generating queries that target attack models and in turn gain 
insight on the memberships or classes of those queries belonging to the target dataset 
(Chakraborty et al. 2018). There are demonstrated examples of these attacks involving Markov 
models, public APIs, and Google and Amazon’s online Machine learning (ML) services 
(Chakraborty et al. 2018). 
 
3.2.9 Path-finding attacks  
 
Pathfinding attacks explore or traverse the trees such as binary trees, multi-nary trees, and 
regression trees for the path until the end node or leaf is reached (Duddu, 2018). The attackers 
try to manipulate the input features and repeat the process until successfully finding the next 
node or leaf (Nguyen, 2018). Tremor et al. proposed pathfinding attacks and use parameters of a 
tree, node, and an identifier (Nguyen, 2018). 
 
3.2.10 Least cost and constrained attacks 
 
Lease cost and constrained attacks require a trade-off between the minimum perturbation 
and the successfulness (or the effectiveness) of the attack (Li et al., 2018). The attack success is 
measured by the impact on the classifier’s confidence by the perturbed differences between the 
distorted and original input (Li et al., 2018).  In the least cost and constrained context, the 
attacker would require the minimum amount of perturbations and is also restricted by the 
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constrains of target class or box-constraint.  Szegedy et al. successfully demonstrated these types 
of attacks (as cited in Li et al., 2018).  
 
3.2.11 Causative integrity attacks 
• Red herring attacks.  Red Herring attacks, introduced by Newsome et al. in 2005 and 2006, 
exploit weaknesses in the conjunction learners of the polymorphic virus detector (Barreno et 
al., 2010). The polymorphic virus detector thwart security attacks using virus signatures and 
those are learned using a conjunction learner and Naïve-Bayes learner (Barreno et al., 2010). 
The attacker uses training distribution data set used by the defender and introduce malicious 
features, bypassing the detector (Barreno et al., 2010). 
• Prove Approximately Correct (PAC) learning framework attacks.  These types of attacks are 
concerned with bounds of malicious errors in the training data (Barreno et al., 2010).  Kearns 
and Li extended the work of Valiant’s PAC learning framework and proved that the attacker 
can restrict the confidence of the learners or the success of an algorithm, given by the 
probability of incorrect prediction (Barreno et al., 2010).  These attacks can be targeted and 
indiscriminate and fits the description of a causative game (Barreno et al., 2010). 
 
3.2.12 Causative availability attacks 
• Correlated outlier attacks. Correlated outlier attacks, introduced by Newsome et al in 2006, 
exploit weakness in the naïve bays like learner of the polymorphic virus detector. The 
attackers add malicious features in the positive instances of the training data set and cause the 
detector to block the normal traffic, much like a denial of service attack. These attacks can be 
targeted and indiscriminate and fits the description of the cognitive game (Barreno et al., 
2010). 
• Allergy attacks.  Allergy attacks, introduced by Chung and Mok in 2006 and 2007, attack the 
autograph warm signature generation system (Barreno et al., 2010). The signature system 
works by analyzing the infected nodes and malicious traffic using the behavioral patterns and 
blocking rules (Barreno et al., 2010). The attacker can manipulate the system by scanning the 
network and flood the crafted packets toward the targeted nodes, which results in legitimate 
traffic being blocked as a DoS prevention (Barreno et al., 2010).  These attacks fit the 
description of a causative game (Barreno et al., 2010). 
 
3.2.13 Exploratory integrity attacks: 
• Polymorphic blending attacks. In the polymorphic blending attacks, the attackers encrypt 
their traffic which closely resembles the normal traffic in order to evade intrusion detection 
systems (IDS).  Foogla and Lee in 2006 demonstrated the example of these attacks in 2006 
(Barreno et al., 2010). 
• Sequence based intrusion detection system (IDS) attacks.  A type of mimicry attack that uses 
the modified version of exploits such as the password and trace out programs, sequences of 
system calls against the IDS, as demonstrated by Tan et al. (2002), and a framework such as 
pH for validating vulnerabilities of IDS, as demonstrated by Wagner and Soto (2002) 
(Barreno et al., 2010). 
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• Good word attacks. In the good word attacks, the attackers add good words or non-spam 
words in the spam emails and evade the detection by the spam filters (Barreno et al., 2010).  
Lowd and Meek (2005b) and Wittel and Wu (2004) demonstrated the examples of these (as 
cited in Barreno et al., 2010). 
• Reverse engineering classifiers attacks. These types of attacks consider a cost function rather 
than the positive and negative labels of the classifier (Barreno et al., 2010).  An algorithm is 
already provided to the attackers for reverse engineering classifiers, as demonstrated by 
Lowd and Meek (2005a) (as cited in Barreno et al., 2010). 
 
3.2.14 Exploratory availability attacks 
Any types of denial of service attacks fall into this category and are common for non-
learning systems. However, they are not so common for the learning processes or systems.  Some 
demonstrated examples are there such as the attacker taking advantage of the computationally 
expensive image processing to scan advertisements in the spam detection systems (Dredze, 
Gevaryahu, & Elias-Bachrach, 2007; Wang et al., 2017), or the attacker convincing the IPS 
trained on intrusion traffic to block the legitimate host or drop the normal traffic (Barreno et al., 
2018). 
  
3.2.15 Stackelberg prediction game (SPG) attacks or game-theoretical perspective 
 
In these types of attacks a game scenario is depicted where the attackers attack the learning 
models and try to prevent learning new knowledge or feed garbage knowledge that results in 
misclassification. The attack strategies are to maximize the cost function of the model.  In the 
case of different attacking goals and attackers, Zhou and Kantarcioglu described the attacks as 
Nested Stackelberg Game attacks (as cited in Nguyen, 2018).  Those can be prevented using the 
set of models to confuse the attackers as one of the strategies (Nguyen, 2018).  A cost-sensitive 
game-theoretical perspective has also been used for adversarial classification by Dalvi et al. (as 
cited in Chakraborty et al., 2018). 
 
3.2.16 Gradient descent (GD) attacks  
 
Gradient descent attacks are common in both the supervised and unsupervised learning and 
rely on the detailed model information (Gardiner & Nagaraja, 2016). Some examples of that 
include Fast-Gradient Sign Method (FGSM), DeepFool, Jacobian Saliency Map Attack (JSMA), 
Houdini, Carlini-Wagner (CW) attack, Basic Iterative Method (BIM), etc. (Brendel, Rauber, & 
Bethge, 2018).  GD is an optimization algorithm that seeks to minimize the output function and 
moving towards the steepest descent (Gardiner & Nagaraja, 2016). The attackers generate attack 
points which are then tested for their effectiveness using their own learners, and in the case of 
non-effectiveness, continue to generate new points using GD until the attacks are successful 
(Gardiner and Nagaraja, 2016). One defense approach is to mask the gradients and techniques 
and means such as defensive distillation, saturated nonlinearities, and nondifferentiable 
classifiers exist for that (Brendel, Rauber, & Bethge, 2018; Papernot et al., 2016c). 
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3.2.17 Fast gradient sign method (FGSM) 
 
Fast gradient sign method is used to generate adversarial examples and was introduced by 
Goodfellow et al. (Duddu, 2018).  It is among the very first and few methods to test using the 
adversarial examples against the against the neutral networks and deep learning models (Li et al., 
2018).  FGSM is quite fast in operations because it takes only the gradient information (Li et al., 
2018).  FGSM calculates the gradient of the cost function using the input features or 
perturbations (Chakraborty et al., 2018).  FGSM has been tested on GoogLeNet images with a 
small input feature vector.  The elements of the vector are comprised of the sign of the gradient 
of the loss function (or the cost function), the perturbation, parameters, and input (Ozdag, 2018).  
There are various variants of FGSM exist such as the target class method, basic iterative method 
(BIM), projected gradient descent (PGD), L-BFGS, etc. (Chakraborty et al., 2018; Li et al., 2018; 
Ozdag, 2018). 
 
3.2.18 Carlini-Wagner (CW) attacks 
 
An adversarial example technique that is capable of evading various defenses including the 
recent defensive distillation (Duddu, 2018; Ozdag, 2018). CW uses three types of attack: L2 
attack, L0 attack, L∞ attack and beat some of the promising defense algorithms. Defensive 
distillation which was developed to test the robustness of the neutral network is also vulnerable 
to CW attacks (Papernot et al., 2016c; Carlini et al., 2019). L0 was the first technique used in 
misclassification using the perturbed images of ImageNet. L0 attack measures the distance 
between the given input and the perturbed input, whereas L2 attack measures the root mean score 
between the given input and the perturbed input. Similarly, L∞ measure the maximum changes in 
all dimensions.  One example of CW attack is demonstrated by Chen et al. (2017) (as cited in 
Rauber & Bethoe, 2018). 
 
3.2.19 Jacobian-based saliency MAP (JSMA) attacks 
 
This approach was proposed by Papernot et al. and uses adversarial saliency scores to 
identify the sensitivity of the model or fool the network (Duddu, 2018; Ozdag, 2018). The 
approach iteratively uses input features for perturbations and construct a map of those relating to 
output variations.  This method is called a forward derivative and uses a matrix defined as the 
Jacobian of the function or Jacobian of the training model (Chakraborty et al., 2018; Ozdag, 
2018). The saliency map is like a visualization tool that allows to generate and explore 
adversarial examples that causes the desired changes in the classifier’s output (Li et al., 2018; 
Ozdag, 2018).  One example of such an attack include the black box variants of JSMA by This 
includes black-box variants of JSMA by Narodytska and Kasiviswanathan (2016) (as cited in 
Brendel, Rauber, & Bethge, 2018) 
 
4. Comparisons of related work 
A comprehensive list of security attacks and perturbations and their related reference studies 
is provided in the table 1 in Appendix A.  Below are the brief comparisons of three most 
common security attacks and perturbations and the preferred ML/DL methods and datasets.  A 
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study of intrusion detection by machine learning by Tsai et al. (2009) inspired this comparison 
work and much of the presentation style has been adopted from the same reference.  
 
4.1 Security attacks and perturbations 
 
The three most common security attacks and perturbations are chosen based on the largest 
number of counts in that category from the table 4 in Appendix A.  The resulting Table 1 
generated, reveals the following: Poisoning / Causative (18); Adversarial Example / Evasion 
(62); and Exploratory (13).  Figure 1 presents a column chart of the yearwise distribution of 
reference studies for security attacks / perturbations.  The chart reveals a majority of the work 
have been performed in the last three years and the trend appears to be positive and upward 
for the all three categories.  We predict a similar trend for all the categories in future. 
 
4.2. Machine learning and deep learning methods 
 
A variety of machine learning and deep learning methods, pre-trained models and systems 
have been used to study adversarial security attacks and perturbations.  The methods of SVM, 
NN, and DNN have been the popular choices.  Their growth has been steady in the last four 
years and most of the work on those has been performed in the last two years.  Other methods 
such as CNN, DT, NB, LR, etc. have also been the popular choices for the studies. 
 
4.3 Datasets 
 
Table 3 presents the three most popular datasets and their reference studies.   Figure 3 
presents a column chart of the yearwise distribution of the datasets with their matching 
reference studies.  MNIST, CIFAR, ImageNet have been the popular choices of datasets and 
their trend is growing yearwise for security attacks and perturbations.  Some other popular 
choices of datasets also include GTSRB (German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark), 
Contagio, Synthetic Images, Real-World datasets, etc. 
 
Table 1 
Total number of reference studies for the most common security attacks and perturbations 
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Security 
Attacks / 
Perturbations 
Poisoning / 
Causative 
Adversarial Example / Evasion Exploratory 
No. of 
Reference 
Studies 
18 62 13 
Reference 
Studies 
Baracaldo et al. 
(2018);  Barreno 
(2008); Biggio 
(2016); Biggio et al. 
(2014); Biggio, 
Nelson, and Laskov 
(2013); Chen et al. 
(2018); Jagielski et 
al. (2018); Kloft and 
Laskov (2012); 
Kumar and Mehta 
(2018); Li et al. 
(2016); Mozaffari-
Kermani et al. 
(2015); Nelson et al. 
(2008); Rubinstein 
et al. (2009); Shi 
and Sagduyu 
(2017); Suciu et al. 
(2018); Xiao 
(2012); Xiao, Xiao, 
and Eckert (2012); 
Yang et al. (2017) 
Alfaro (2018); Athalye et al. (2018); Bhagoji et al. (2017a, b); 
Biggio (2016); Biggio et al. (2017); Chen et al., 2017; Cisse et al. 
(2017); Comesaña, Pérez-Freire, & Pérez-González (2006); Czaja et 
al. (2018); Elsayed, Goodfellow, and Sohl-Dickstein (2018); Eykholt 
et al. (2018a); Eykholt et al. (2018b); Goodfellow et al. (2014); 
Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy (2015); Han and Rubinstein 
(2017); Hayes & Danezis (2017); Jia and Gong (2018); Kantchelian, 
Tygar, & Joseph (2016); Khalid et al. (2018a, b); Khalid et al. 
(2019); Kloft and Laskov (2012); Kolosnjaji et al. (2018); Kos, J., 
Fischer, and Song (2017); Kurakin, Goodfellow, & Bengio (2017); 
Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio (2017); Larsen et al. (2016); 
Levina, Sleptsova, Zaitsev (2016); Li & Vorobeychik (2014); Liang 
et al. (2017); Liu et al. (2017); Liu et al. (2018a); Lowd, D., & 
Meek., C. (2005); Luo et al. (2018); Madry et al. (2017); Melis et al. 
(2018); Moosavi-Dezfooli, Fawzi, & Frossard (2016); Narodytska 
and Kasiviswanathan (2016); Norton and Qi (2017); Ozdag (2018); 
Papernot et al. (2016); Papernot et al. (2017); Papernot, McDaniel, 
and Goodfellow (2016); Quiring, Arp, and Rieck (2018); Shi and 
Sagduyu (2017); Sitawarin et al. (2018); Srndic and Laskov (2014); 
Su, Vargas, and Kouichi (2017); Suciu et al. (2018); Suya et al. 
(2017); Szegedy et al. (2014); Wang et al. (2017); Xiao (2012); Xiao 
et al. (2015); Xiao et al. (2017); Xiao, Xiao, and Eckert (2012); Xu, 
Evans, and Qi (2018); Xu, Qi, and Evans (2016); Yakura and 
Sakuma (2018); Zhang et al. (2016) 
  
Ateniese et a. (2015); 
Barreno (2008); 
Nguyen (2018); 
Salem et al. (2018); 
Sethi and Kantardzic 
(2018a); Sethi, 
Kantardzic, and Ryu 
(2018); Shi and 
Sagduyu (2017); 
Shokri et al. (2017); 
Tramer et al. (2016); 
Wang and Gong 
(2018); Xue and 
Chuah (2018); Yeom 
et al. (2018) 
 
 
Figure 1. Yearwise distribution of reference studies for security attacks / perturbations 
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No. of 
Reference 
Studies 
34 23 20 
Reference 
Studies 
Chen et al. (2018);  Biggio, Nelson, and Laskov 
(2013);  Baracaldo et al. (2018);  Biggio et al. 
(2014);  Xiao et al. (2015);  Xiao (2012);  Xiao, 
Xiao, and Eckert (2012);  Liu et al. (2018a);  Shi, 
Sagduyu, and Grushin (2017);  Sethi and Kantardzic 
(2018a);  Sethi, Kantardzic, and Ryu (2018);  
Levina, Sleptsova, Zaitsev (2016);  Biggio et al. 
(2017);  Srndic and Laskov (2014);  Ateniese et a. 
(2015);  Papernot, McDaniel, and Goodfellow 
(2016);  Zhang et al. (2016);  Wang and Gong 
(2018);  Melis et al. (2018);  Bhagoji et al. (2017a, 
b);  Suya et al. (2017);  Han and Rubinstein (2017);  
Bulò et al. (2017);  Kantarcioglu and Xi (2017);  
Kantarcioglu and Xi (2016;  2017);  Zhou and 
Kantarcioglu (2016);  Nguyen (2018);  Zhang and 
Zhu (2018);  Bruckner and Scheffer (2009);  
Bruckner and Scheffer (2011);  Nguyen (2018);  
Vorobeychik and Li (2014);  Li & Vorobeychik 
(2014) 
Alfaro (2018); Athalye et al. 
(2018); Athalye, Carlini, and 
Wagner (2018); Biggio et al. 
(2017); Carlini and Wagner 
(2017); Chen et al. (2017); 
Clements and Lao (2018); 
Fredrikson, Jha, Ristenpart 
(2015); Han and Rubinstein 
(2017); Hanzlik et al. (2018); 
Hayes & Danezis (2017); Jia 
and Gong (2018); Kolosnjaji et 
al. (2018); Kumar & Mehta 
(2018); Kurakin, Goodfellow, 
and Bengio (2017); Madry et 
al. (2017); Oh et al. (2018); 
Ozdag (2018); Shokri et al. 
(2017); Suciu et al. (2018); 
Szegedy et al. (2014); Wang 
and Gong (2018); Yang et al. 
(2017) 
Danezis (2017); Ji et al. (2018); 
Khalid et al. (2018a, b); Khalid 
et al. (2019); Liang et al. 
(2017); Liu et al. (2017); Luo et 
al. (2018); Nguyen (2018); 
Ozdag (2018); Papernot et al. 
(2016); Papernot et al. (2017); 
Papernot, McDaniel, and 
Goodfellow (2016); Quiring, 
Arp, and Rieck (2018); Su, 
Vargas, and Kouichi (2017); 
Tramer et al. (2016); Wang and 
Gong (2018); Wang et al. 
(2017); Xu, Evans, and Qi 
(2018); Yakura and Sakuma 
(2018); Yang et al. (2017) 
 
 
Figure 2. Yearwise distribution of reference studies for ML/DL methods 
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Datasets MNIST CIFAR ImageNet 
 
No. of 
Reference 
Studies 
36 22 11 
Reference 
Studies 
Alfaro (2018); Athalye, Carlini, and Wagner (2018); 
Biggio et al. (2014); Biggio et al. (2017); Biggio, 
Nelson, and Laskov (2013); Brendel, Rauber, and 
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The machine learning (ML) and deep learning (DL) methods offer promising solutions 
to services and products.  The underlying technologies of these methods, however, are new 
and still evolving.  The development and implementation of DM and ML models themselves 
have been a challenge as they require expert knowledge from multiple domains.  Depending 
on the requirements and goals, the models are continuously improved for their accuracies 
manipulating the parameters of equations and for their performances deploying in the 
distributed systems or cloud environments.  The source of training and test data and the 
deployed environment are also sometimes guarded for privacy and secrecy of the learning 
models.  All these different scenarios and factors contribute to the vulnerabilities of the ML 
and DL methods and those can be exploited by the adversaries.  In this paper, we presented 
some simplified knowledge pertaining to ML and DL methods and relevant adversarial 
security attacks and perturbations.  Specifically, we focused on the background, definitions, 
terms, descriptions, and comparisons of ML and DL methods and security attacks.  A 
comprehensive list of security attacks and perturbations is provided in the table in Appendix 
A.  We hope the new entrants of cyber security in the research area will benefit tremendously 
from the new and structured knowledge offered in this paper.  Even though several research 
papers exist that reviews adversarial security attacks and perturbations, but there is always 
room to grow due to the dynamic nature of ML and DL methods.  The learning models that 
are ideal and produce satisfying results remain an open and a lasting challenge.  This includes 
the issue of adversarial security attacks and perturbations because of its relation to the DM 
and ML methods.  Also, a few papers cover the defenses of adversarial security attacks and 
perturbations; however, some of those defenses have already been beaten or their robustness 
are questionable (Carlini et al., 2019).  In our future work, we anticipate covering those in a 
revised version or another series of this paper. 
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Table 1 
A list of adversarial security attacks and perturbations 
 
Adversarial 
Security Attacks 
& Perturbations 
Types, Features 
or Target 
Methods/Approaches 
ML and DL 
Methods 
Involved 
Data Used Reference Studies 
Poisoning Training Data 
Mobile Malware Detection 
Systems 
SVM, RF, 
KNN 
Android 
Application 
Samples 
Chen et al. (2018) 
Poisoning Gradient-Ascent Gradient Ascent Strategy SVM MNIST 
Biggio, Nelson, and 
Laskov (2013) 
Poisoning Evasion 
General Framework; Biometric 
Identity Recognition System 
Classifiers N/A Biggio (2016) 
Poisoning Training Data 
Collaborative Filtering 
Algorithms 
Projected 
Gradient 
Ascent (PGA) 
MovieLens dataset 
Li et al. (2016); 
Kumar and Mehta 
(2018) 
Poisoning Training Data A Proposed Attack Procedure Many Healthcare Datasets. 
Mozaffari-Kermani 
et al. (2015) 
Poisoning Training Data Provenance Frameworks SVMs IoT Data 
Baracaldo et al. 
(2018) 
Poisoning 
Evasion; 
Privacy 
Preserving 
Prediction Errors SVM 
MNIST; Contagio 
Dataset 
Biggio et al. (2014) 
Label Noise 
Adversarial 
Examples; 
Training Data 
Security of SVM algorithms SVM 
Real-World 
Datasets at LibSVM 
website; Synthetic 
Xiao et al. (2015) 
Pattern 
Classifiers 
Training and 
Testing Data 
Sets 
A Framework for Empirical of 
Evaluation of Classifier Security 
Different 
Classifiers and 
Algorithms 
Different Ones 
Biggio, Fumera, and 
Roli (2014a) 
Control-Flow 
Hijacking; 
Denial-of-service 
(DoS) 
Evasion 
Vulnerabilities in DL Frameworks 
such as Caffe, Tensorflow, Torch 
DL 
Frameworks 
Dependencies: 
NumPy; 
OpenCV 
MNIST Xiao et al. (2017) 
False Data 
Injection (FDI) 
Power Systems 
Multiple Linear Regression 
Models 
Linear 
Regression 
IEEE 24-Bus and 
118-Bus Systems 
Zhang et al. (2018) 
Boundary 
Decision-Based; 
Blackbox 
Clarifai.com Brand Recognition 
Model. 
Cloud-based 
Computer 
Vision 
API by 
Clarifai 
MNIST; CIFAR; 
ImageNet 
Brendel, Rauber, 
and Bethge (2018) 
Label Flipping 
Poisoning; 
Adversarial 
Example 
Adversarial Label Flips on SVMs 
SVM - Linear 
and RBF 
Kernel 
LIBSVM Real-
World Datasets 
Xiao (2012); Xiao, 
Xiao, and Eckert 
(2012) 
Targeted 
Adversarial 
Defenses 
Adversarial 
Defenses 
Adversarial Logit Pairing (ALP); 
Kannan, Kurakin, and 
Goodfellow Threat Model; 
Projected Gradient Descent 
(PGD) 
ALP Trained 
Model 
CIFAR-10; MNIST; 
ImageNet 
Engstrom, Ilyas, and 
Athalye (2018) 
Iterative 
Optimization-
Based; GD-
Based 
White-Box 
Obfuscated Gradients; ICLR 2018 
Defenses 
NNs 
CIFAR-10; MNIST; 
ImageNet 
Athalye, Carlini, and 
Wagner (2018) 
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Targeted 
Adversarial 
Defenses 
White-Box; 
Adversarial 
Defenses 
Pixel Deflection; High-level 
Representation Guided Denoiser; 
Projected Gradient Descent 
(PGD) 
Defenses BPDA; PGD 
Athalye and Carlini 
(2018) 
Adversarial 
Examples 
Fast-Gradient 
Sign Method 
(FGSM); 
Physical-World 
Inputs 
Inception v3 Image Classification; 
Basic Iterative Method (BIM) 
NNs 
A Cell-phone 
Camera as an Input 
Kurakin, 
Goodfellow, and 
Bengio (2017) 
Physical-World 
Inputs; 
Disappearance 
Attacks; Creation 
Attacks 
Adversarial 
Examples; 
Impersonate; 
Spoofing 
YOLO Lab Environment; 
Outdoor Experiments; Faster R-
CNN; LISA-CNN; RP2 
Algorithm 
DNNs Posters; Stickers 
Eykholt et al. 
(2018a); Eykholt et 
al. (2018b) 
Physical-World 
Inputs 
White-Box; 
Adversarial 
Examples 
Sign Embedding Attack; CV-
Based Systems of AVS; Traffic 
Sign Recognition Model 
CNNs 
German Traffic 
Sign Recognition 
Benchmark 
(GTSRB) 
Sitawarin et al. 
(2018) 
Adversarial 
Texture Malware 
Perturbation 
Attacks 
(ATMPA) 
A Framework Malware Visualization Method 
CNN, SVM, 
RF 
Kaggle Microsoft 
Malware 
Classification 
Challenge (BIG 
2015). 
Liu et al. (2018a) 
One Pixel 
Adversarial 
Examples 
Differential Evolution (DE) DNNs 
CIFAR-10; 
ImageNet 
Su, Vargas, and 
Kouichi (2017) 
Poisoning; Fast 
Statistical 
Poisoning 
Theoretically-Grounded 
Optimization framework 
Linear 
Regression 
Healthcare; Loan; 
House Price 
Datasets 
Jagielski et al. 
(2018) 
Reverse 
Engineering 
(RE); Model 
Extraction; 
Membership 
Inference 
ML API 
MLCapsule - An Offline 
Deployment of MLaaS; Intel’s 
Software Guard Extensions 
(SGX), 
NNs 
MNIST; CIFAR; 
GTSDB 
Hanzlik et al. (2018) 
Dictionary; 
Focused 
Causative 
SpamBayes - Spam Email 
System; Indiscriminate and 
Targeted Attacks 
K-fold cross-
validation 
Text Retrieval 
Conference 
(TREC) 2005 
Nelson et al. (2008) 
Multi-Agent 
Networks 
Learning Rules 
Byzantine Fault-Tolerant Non-
Bayesian Learning (BFL) 
Non-Bayesian 
Learning 
N/A 
Su and Vaidya 
(2016) 
Adversarial 
Example 
Evasion; White-
box 
Text-based; The Cost Gradients 
of the Input 
DNN 
Hot Training / 
Sample Phrases 
Liang et al. (2017) 
Physical 
Adversarial 
Examples 
Remote Sensing; Satellite Image 
Classification Problems 
CNN-I (a 
variant of 
DenseNet) 
Functional Map of 
the World (fMoW) 
Czaja et al. (2018) 
Exploratory; 
Causative; 
Evasion 
Influence 
Attacks; 
Training Data 
Text/Image Classification; CNTK FNN Attacker Test Data 
Shi and Sagduyu 
(2017) 
Black-Box 
Exploratory; 
Training/Testing 
Data 
CNTK; NTLK; Sci-Kit; Text 
Classification 
NB; SVM; DL Reuters-21578 
Shi, Sagduyu, and 
Grushin (2017) 
Anchor Points 
(AP) 
Exploratory; 
Blackbox 
Seed-Explore- Exploit framework 
KNN, SVM-
RBF, DT, RF 
KDD99, 
CAPTCHA, 
Spambase, etc. 
Sethi and Kantardzic 
(2018a) 
Anchor Points 
(AP); Reverse 
Engineering 
Exploratory; 
Blackbox 
Exploration-exploitation Based 
Strategy; A Data Driven 
Framework 
KNN, SVM-
RBF, DT, RF 
KDD99, 
CAPTCHA, 
Spambase, etc. 
Sethi, Kantardzic, 
and Ryu (2018) 
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Side-channel; 
Cryptoalgorithms 
Evasion Power Traces of AES Encryption 
SVMs, DTs, 
RFs 
Power Traces from 
DPA Contest 
Website and 
TeSCASE Website 
Levina, Sleptsova, 
Zaitsev (2016) 
Evasion; Oracle Blackbox 
Digital Watermarking; Break Our 
Watermarking System (BOWS) 
DNN 
Raise Image; 
Dresden Image 
Quiring, Arp, and 
Rieck (2018) 
Filter-aware 
Adversarial 
ML 
Evasion VGGNet model DNNs 
German Traffic 
Sign Recognition 
Benchmarks 
(GTSRB) Dataset, 
Khalid et al. (2018a, 
b); Khalid et al. 
(2019) 
Mimicry 
Evasion; 
Training and 
Testing Data 
Sets 
Gradient Descent Component 
SVM; Neural 
Networks 
MNIST 
Handwritten Digits; 
Contagio Dataset 
Biggio et al. (2017) 
Mimicry 
Evasion; 
Gradient-Based 
Gradient Descent–Kernel Density 
Estimation (GD-KDE); PDFRate 
System for Detecting Malicious 
PDF Files 
SVM; RF 
Contagio; 
Surrogate; Attack 
Srndic and Laskov 
(2014) 
Tree Ensemble Evasion 
Mixed Integer Linear Program 
(MILP); Approximate Evasion 
Algorithm 
Boosted Trees; 
RF 
MNIST 
Handwritten Digits 
Dataset 
Kantchelian, Tygar, 
& Joseph (2016) 
Problem Space; 
Feature Space 
Evasion; 
Training Data 
EvadeML - ML-Based PDF 
Malware Detector; MalGAN 
SL2013; 
HIDOST 
Contagio Archive Tong et al. (2018) 
Model Extraction 
Evasion; 
Blackbox 
PDF Malware Classifiers; 
Robustness of Classifiers 
GP; PDFRate 
(Random 
Forest); 
HIDOST 
(SVM) 
Contagio Archive 
Xu, Qi, and Evans 
(2016) 
Feature 
Squeezing 
Adversarial 
Example 
Feature Squeezing: Color Depth 
and Spatial Smoothing. 
DNNs 
MNIST; ImageNet; 
CIFAR-10 
Xu, Evans, and Qi 
(2018) 
Information 
Leakage 
Exploratory; 
Training Data 
A Model: Meta-Classifier 
ANNs; SVMs; 
HMM; DT 
Internet Traffic 
Classifier; Speech 
Recognition 
Software 
Ateniese et a. (2015) 
Adversarial 
Examples 
Evasion; 
Blackbox; 
Training/Testing 
Forward Derivatives / Adversarial 
Saliency Maps; JSMA; Image 
Classification 
DNN 
MNIST Dataset; 
Handwritten Set 
Papernot et al. 
(2016) 
Adversarial 
Examples 
Black-box 
Reservoir Sampling; Remote ML 
Classifiers; 
DNNs, LR, 
SVMs, DTs, 
kNNs 
MNIST 
Papernot, McDaniel, 
and Goodfellow 
(2016) 
Adversarial 
Examples 
Evasion 
Neural Networks: Sigmoid; 
ReLU; RBFI 
NNs MNIST Alfaro (2018) 
Feature Selection Evasion 
Adversary-Aware Feature 
Selection Model 
SVM with 
RBF Kernel 
PDF malware; 
Spam dataset 
Zhang et al. (2016) 
A Threat Model 
Categorization 
of Threats and 
Defenses 
A Threat Model for categorizing 
attacks and defenses 
Any Any 
Papernot et al. 
(2018; 2016b) 
Adversarial 
Examples 
Adversarial 
Examples 
Prediction Errors; L-BFGS 
Neural 
Networks 
MNIST; ImageNet; 
YouTube Image 
Samples 
Szegedy et al. 
(2014) 
Attribute 
Inference 
Evasion AttriGard 
LR, RF, 
Neural 
Networks 
Google Play Apps Jia and Gong (2018) 
Reverse 
Engineering 
(RE) 
Black-box 
Metamodel Input (T-SNE); 
Adversarial Image Perturbations 
NNs 
MNIST; ImageNet 
Classifiers 
Oh et al. (2018) 
Availability 
Causative; 
Training Data 
Dictionary Attack; Focused 
Attack 
SpamBayes TREC corpus Barreno (2008) 
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Integrity 
Exploratory; 
Training Data 
Learner Comparison with GMM, 
PMM, SVM 
LDA 
Enron email corpus; 
Email traces 
Barreno (2008) 
Hyperparameter 
Stealing 
Exploratory 
Theoretical and Empirical 
Evaluations, 
RR, LR; SVM; 
NN 
Diabetes, GeoOrig; 
Iris; Mandelon, etc. 
Wang and Gong 
(2018) 
Zeroth-Order 
Optimization 
Black-box 
Only Access to the Input (Images) 
and the Output (confidence 
scores) of a targeted DNN. 
DNNs MNIST; CIFAR Chen et al. (2017b) 
Targeted Noise 
Injection; Small 
Community 
Black-box; 
Adversarial ML 
Graph Clustering; Domain Name 
Generation Algorithms (DGAs) 
Singular Value 
Decomposition 
(SVD) 
US 
Telecommunication; 
a US University; a 
Threat Feed 
Chen et al., 2017 
Adversarial 
Example 
Adversarial 
Example - 
Audio 
Speech Recognition Model DNNs Audio Phrases 
Yakura and Sakuma 
(2018) 
Adversarial 
Examples 
Gradient-Based 
Attacks 
Robustness of DNNs classifier; 
DeepFool Algorithm 
Convolutional 
DNN 
MNIST; CIFAR-10; 
ILSVRC 2012 
Moosavi-Dezfooli, 
Fawzi, & Frossard 
(2016) 
Evasion 
Gradient-based 
Attacks; Black-
box 
Android Malware Detection 
System 
SVM; SVM-
RBF; RFs 
Drebin Data - 
Benign and 
Malicious Samples. 
Melis et al. (2018) 
Evasion 
Fast Gradient 
Sign Method 
(FGSM) 
FGSM; Fast-Jacobian Saliency 
Map Apriori (FJSMA); web-
based application 
CNN MNIST 
Norton and Qi 
(2017) 
Poisoning 
Direct Gradient 
Method 
Generative Adversarial Network 
(GAN) 
NNs; DNN MNIST; CIFAR Yang et al. (2017) 
Hardware Trojan A Framework 
Threat Models and Taxonomy; 
General Framework 
NNs; CNNs MNIST; CIFAR 
Clements and Lao 
(2018) 
Evasion 
Score-Based 
Attacks; Black-
box 
Black-box Variants of JSMA; 
One-Pixel; Greedy Local-Search 
CNNs 
MNIST; CIFAR; 
SVHN; STL 
Narodytska and 
Kasiviswanathan 
(2016) 
Adversarial 
Example 
Black-box; 
Transfer-based 
Attack a DNN by 
MetaMind (an API); API by 
Google, Amazon 
DNNs 
MNIST; 
Handcrafted; 
GTSRB 
Papernot et al. 
(2017) 
Adversarial 
Example 
Black-box; 
Transfer-based 
Ensemble-based Approaches 
DNNs; 
ResNet; VGG; 
GoogLeNet 
ILSVRC 2012 Liu et al. (2017) 
Universal 
Adversarial 
Perturbations 
Score-Based 
Attacks 
Generator Networks That Predict 
Adversarial; Universal 
Adversarial Networks (UANs) 
NNs CIFAR; ImageNet 
Hayes & Danezis 
(2017) 
Evasion 
White-box; 
Adversarial 
Defense 
Data Transformations 
PCA; SVMs; 
DNNs; CNNs 
MNIST image 
dataset; UCI Human 
Activity 
Recognition (HAR) 
dataset 
Bhagoji et al. 
(2017a, b) 
Optimization-
based Methods 
Query-Limited; 
Black-box 
Bayesian Optimization Based 
Method 
SVM; ANNs Email Spam Dataset Suya et al. (2017) 
Evasion Gradient-based 
The Vulnerability of Malware 
Detection Methods - Raw bytes 
input 
NNs 
Malware Samples - 
VirusShare, Citadel 
and APT1. 
Kolosnjaji et al. 
(2018) 
Fast Gradient 
Sign Methods 
(FGSM) 
Adversarial 
Example 
Linear Perturbation DNNs MNIST 
Goodfellow, Shlens, 
and Szegedy (2015); 
Ozdag (2018) 
Poisoning 
(Stingray); 
Evasion 
A General 
Framework 
The FAIL Attacker Model NNs 
CIFAR; Drebin; 
Twitter 
vulnerability 
databases 
Suciu et al. (2018) 
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Carlini-Wagner 
(CW) 
Score-Based 
Attacks 
Defeat Defensive Distillation; 
Deep fool, Fast Gradient Sign, 
and Iterative Gradient Sign. 
NNs 
MNIST; CIFAR; 
ImageNet 
Carlini and Wagner 
(2017); Chen et al. 
(2017); Ozdag 
(2018) 
Adversarial 
Example 
Black-box 
Houdini and CTC for Speech 
recognition, pose estimation and 
semantic segmentation. 
Speech system SSIM; Perceptibility Cisse et al. (2017) 
Adversarial 
Example 
Human 
Perceptual 
System 
Adversarial Example Attack 
Crafting 
Method with Human Perceptual 
System 
DNNs MNIST; CIFAR-10 Luo et al. (2018) 
Adversarial 
Example - 3D 
Physical-World 
Inputs 
Expectation Over Transformation 
(EOT); InceptionV3 Classifier 
NNs 3D-Printing Models Athalye et al. (2018) 
Evasion 
Gradient 
Descent (GD) 
Gradient Descent 
non-liner 
SVMs 
MNIST; USPS; 
SpamBase 
Han and Rubinstein 
(2017) 
Projected 
Gradient Descent 
(PGD) 
Adversarial 
Example 
Robust Optimization NNs MNIST; CIFAR-10 
Madry et al. (2017); 
Ozdag (2018) 
Basic Iterative 
Method (BIM) 
Adversarial 
Example 
Iterative FGSM; Label Leaking DT, RF ImageNet 
Kurakin, 
Goodfellow, & 
Bengio (2017); 
Ozdag (2018) 
Model Inversion 
ML-as-a-service 
APIs. 
ML-as-a-Service (MLaaS) API; 
Face Recognition 
DT, NNs 
FiveThirtyEight 
Survey; General 
Social Survey 
(GSS) 
Fredrikson, Jha, 
Ristenpart (2015); 
Kumar & Mehta 
(2018) 
Model Extraction 
Blackbox; Path 
Finding 
ML-as-a-Service (MLaaS) API LR; DNN; DT 
German Credit 
Data; Circles, Iris, 
Adult Data 
Tramer et al. (2016); 
Wang and Gong 
(2018); Nguyen 
(2018) 
Model Extraction PLM-Based 
Primitive Learning Modules 
(PLMs); RNN Model Evaluation; 
LSTM 
RNN; LR; RF 
Synthetic and Real-
World Datasets 
Xue and Chuah 
(2018) 
Membership 
Inference 
Model 
Extraction; 
Defenses 
ML-as-a-Service (MLaaS) - 
Google Cloud Prediction API 
MLP; LR; RF 
MNIST, CIFAR-10, 
CIFAR-100, etc. 
Salem et al. (2018) 
Membership 
Inference; OR 
Attribute 
Inference 
Information 
from Training 
Data 
Connection to Overfitting and 
influence - Privacy of Training 
Data 
LR, DT, CNNs 
Models 
MNIST; CIFAR Yeom et al. (2018) 
Membership 
Inference 
Black-box 
Quantitative Assessment; ML-as-
a-service 
NNs; CNNs 
MNIST; CIFAR; 
Texas Hospital -
Stay Dataset, Adult 
Dataset 
Shokri et al. (2017) 
Backdoor 
Primitive 
Learning 
Modules (PLM) 
-Based 
Inception Model v3 DNN ImageNet; ISIC Ji et al. (2018) 
Adversarial 
Example 
GAN - VAE 
GAN Discriminator - Learned 
Feature Representations 
VAE/GAN 
Models 
Smaller Images; 
Enc, Dec and Dis 
Larsen et al. (2016) 
Adversarial 
Example 
GAN - VAE GAN discriminator 
Three attacks; 
ReLU 
activation 
function; 
MNIST, SVHN and 
CelebA 
Kos, J., Fischer, and 
Song (2017) 
Adversarial 
Example 
GAN The Generative Nets 
Adversarial 
Nets; Semi-
supervised 
learning 
MNIST; TFD; 
CIFAR-10 
Goodfellow et al. 
(2014) 
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Adversarial 
Example 
Single 
Perturbation 
Adversarial Reprogramming 
Models trained 
on ImageNet 
MNIST; CIFAR-10 
Elsayed, 
Goodfellow, and 
Sohl-Dickstein 
(2018) 
Adversarial 
Example 
No - Security 
Through 
Obscurity 
Locally Linear 
Embedding (LLE) - Non-
Parametric Dimensionality 
Reduction 
DNNs 
MNIST; IMDB; 
Malware 
Wang et al. (2017) 
Randomized 
Prediction 
Games 
Game Theory; 
Non-
Cooperative 
Randomized Prediction Games SVM 
Handwritten Digit 
Recognition; 
Trec2007; Malware 
in PDF Files. 
Bulò et al. (2017) 
Mimicry 
Attack Models; 
Training Data 
Gradient Descent and Kernel 
Density 
Estimation (GD- KDE) 
SVMs, 
Bayesian, DT, 
RF 
Sina Weibo 
Kantarcioglu and Xi 
(2017) 
Polymorphic 
Blending 
Mimicry Attack 
Byte-Frequency Based IDS; 
PAYL; N-gram 
IDS PAYL Network Traffic Fogla et al. (2006) 
Stackelberg 
Game - Nested 
Free-Range; 
Targeted; Game 
Theory 
A Single-step Two Players’ 
Game; Adversarial Classifier 
Reverse Engineering (ACRE) 
NB; SVM; 
RVM; HME 
Text classification; 
PDF document; 
Feature Extraction 
Kantarcioglu and Xi 
(2016; 2017); Zhou 
and Kantarcioglu 
(2016); Nguyen 
(2018) 
A Game - 
Classifier and 
Adversary 
Game Theory; 
Decision-Based 
Adversarial Classifier System 
NB; 
Adversarial-
Classifiers 
Ling-Spam; Email 
Spam Data 
Dalvi et al. (2004) 
A Game-
Theoretic 
Framework 
Game Theory 
Distributed -SVM; Alternating 
Direction Method of Multipliers 
(ADMoM) 
SVM 
Rand; Spam; 
MNIST 
Zhang and Zhu 
(2018) 
A Single-Shot 
Prediction Game 
Game Theory Equilibria Prediction Models. 
SVM; LR; 
SVM w/ 
Invariances 
Email Spam Filter 
Bruckner and 
Scheffer (2009) 
Stackelberg 
Game 
Game Theory Stackelberg Prediction Game SVM; LR 
Email Spam Filter: 
ESP; Mailing List; 
TREC 2017, etc. 
Bruckner and 
Scheffer (2011); 
Nguyen (2018) 
Adversarial 
Classifier 
Reverse 
Engineering 
(ACRE) 
A Framework 
Randomized Classification 
Schemes; 
NB; SVM 
Enron data; Spam 
Classification 
Vorobeychik and Li 
(2014) 
Cross-
Substitution 
Evasion; 
Adversarial Classifier Algorithm; 
Adversarial Models; Stackelberg 
game multi-adversary model 
(SMA) 
NB; SVM; 
NNs 
Enron data; Ling-
Spam Spam; UCI 
data 
Li & Vorobeychik 
(2014) 
Good Words 
Decision-Based 
Attacks 
Adversarial Classifier Reverse 
Engineering (ACRE); Continuous 
and Boolean features 
Linear 
Classifiers 
Spam Filter Data; 
Dictionary Words 
Lowd, D., & Meek., 
C. (2005 
Blind Newton 
Sensitivity 
Sensitivity-
Based 
Non-Linear Optimization; 
Watermarking Schemes 
ML Detectors Synthetic Images 
Comesaña, Pérez-
Freire, & Pérez-
González (2006); 
Quiring, Arp, and 
Rieck (2018) 
Poisoning; 
Greedy Optimal 
Adversarial 
Noise 
Online Centroid Anomaly 
Detection 
Learning 
model: K-gram 
length; RBF 
kernel 
Network Traffic 
Kloft and Laskov 
(2012 
Poisoning - 
Boiling Frog 
Adversarial 
Defenses; 
Network IDS 
Statistical Machine Learning 
(SML); Antidote; PCA-subspace 
PCA Network Traffic 
Rubinstein et al. 
(2009) 
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Appendix B 
Table 1 
A list of Abbreviations 
 
Abbreviation Full-form 
AE/P Adversarial Examples/Perturbations 
API Application Programming Interface 
CART Classification and Regression Tree 
CD Coordinate Descent 
CNN Convoluted Neural Networks 
CNTK Cognitive Toolkit (Microsoft) 
CPS Cyber–physical System 
CV Computer Vision 
DNN Deep Neural Networks 
DoS Denial of Service 
DR Dimensionality Reduction 
DL Deep Learning 
DT Decision Tree 
FNN Feedforward Neural Network 
GAN Generative Adversarial Network 
GD Gradient Descent 
GMM Gaussian Mixture Model 
GP Genetic Programming 
HMM Hidden Markov Model 
ICS Industrial Control System 
IDS Intrusion Detection System 
IoT Internet of Things 
JSMA Jacobian Saliency Map Approach 
KNN K-Nearest Neighbor 
LDA Latent Dirichlet Allocation 
LR Linear/Logistic Regression 
ML Machine Learning 
MLP  Multi-Layer Perceptron 
N/A Not Applicable 
NB  Naive Bayes 
NN Neural Network 
NTLK Natural Language Toolkit 
PCA Principal Component Analysis 
PGA Projected Gradient Ascent 
PGD Projected Gradient Descent 
RBF Radial Basis Function kernel 
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RF Random Forest 
RR Ridge Regression 
RVM Relevance Vector Machine 
SML Statistical Machine Learning 
SVD  Singular Value Decomposition 
SVM Support Vector Machine 
VAE Variational Autoencoder 
 
